A Return to a Bygone Era?
The Korean Peninsula is once again a tinderbox. North Korean balloons carrying trash float across the border, and in response, South Korea dusts off giant loudspeakers to blast K-pop and anti-Pyongyang propaganda northward. Amidst this escalating, almost surreal, tension, South Korea’s opposition leader, Lee Jae-myung, and his Democratic Party are advocating for a seemingly radical alternative: a return to engagement.
Lee’s vision is a revival of the “Sunshine Policy,” the Nobel Peace Prize-winning approach of the late 1990s and early 2000s that promoted dialogue and economic cooperation over confrontation. The core idea is simple and alluring: treat North Korea not as a pariah to be isolated, but as a partner to be transformed through interaction. The problem? This policy is built on a set of assumptions about North Korea and the world that are, in 2024, dangerously obsolete.
Outdated Assumption #1: The Myth of Denuclearization for Dollars
The first and most fundamental outdated assumption is that North Korea is willing to trade its nuclear weapons for economic prosperity. The original Sunshine Policy was predicated on the belief that by offering economic lifelines like the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourism, Seoul could build trust and gently guide Pyongyang towards denuclearization.
Today, that bargain is off the table. Kim Jong Un’s North Korea is not the same country his father led. Pyongyang has enshrined its status as a nuclear-weapon state into its constitution. Its nuclear arsenal is not a bargaining chip; it is the ultimate guarantor of the regime’s survival. To Kim, giving up his “treasured sword” for economic projects that would increase his country’s dependence on the South is not a strategic trade-off—it’s suicide. He has seen what happened to leaders like Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein. He will not make the same mistake.
Outdated Assumption #2: Does Engagement Really Moderate North Korea?
The second outdated assumption is that engagement will inherently moderate North Korea’s behaviour. Decades of history have proven this to be wishful thinking. The periods of greatest engagement under liberal South Korean administrations often coincided with Pyongyang making significant strides in its illicit weapons programs. The funds and diplomatic space provided by a softer approach were not used to build a more peaceful state, but to quietly finance the very missiles and warheads that now threaten the region. Engagement without strict, verifiable conditions simply enables the aggressor.
Outdated Assumption #3: Ignoring a New World Order
Finally, Lee’s policy seems to ignore the seismic shifts in the geopolitical landscape. The Sunshine Policy was conceived in a post-Cold War world where American unipolarity and a global consensus on non-proliferation provided a framework for negotiations. That world is gone.
Today, we live in an era of renewed great power competition. North Korea has found a powerful new patron in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, trading artillery shells for sophisticated satellite and military technology. This burgeoning alliance gives Pyongyang an alternative economic and strategic lifeline, drastically reducing any leverage Seoul or Washington might have. Furthermore, China, while wary of instability, now views North Korea primarily as a strategic buffer against the United States and its allies. Beijing is more likely to shield Pyongyang from pressure than to help dismantle its arsenal.
A Realistic Path Forward: Deterrence Over Nostalgia
The desire for peace is commendable, and the instinct to choose dialogue over conflict is understandable. But Lee Jae-myung’s approach feels less like a forward-thinking strategy and more like a nostalgic longing for a time that no longer exists. It misreads the motivations of the current Kim regime, overestimates the moderating power of economic aid, and fails to account for a global order that now rewards, rather than punishes, rogue behaviour.
A realistic policy for the Korean Peninsula must begin by accepting the grim reality: North Korea is a nuclear state with no intention of giving up its weapons. The focus, therefore, must shift from the illusion of transformation to the hard-nosed reality of deterrence, containment, and managing an intractable threat. Anything else is not just naive—it’s a dangerous fantasy.
